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Cognitive Checkpoint: Emerging Technologies for
Biometric-Enabled Watchlist Screening
Svetlana N. Yanushkevich, Kelly W. Sundberg, Nathan W. Twyman,
Richard M. Guest, and Vlad P. Shmerko
Abstract—This paper revisits the problem of individual
risk assessment in the layered security model. It con-
tributes to the concept of balancing security and privacy
via cognitive-centric machine called an ’e-interviewer’.
Cognitive checkpoint is a cyber-physical security frontier
in mass-transit hubs that provides an automated screening
using all types of identity (attributed, biometric, and
biographical) from both physical and virtual worlds. We
investigate how the development of the next generation of
watchlist for rapid screening impacts a sensitive balancing
mechanism between security and privacy. We identify di-
rections of such an impact, trends in watchlist technologies,
and propose ways to mitigate the potential risks.
Keywords: Cognitive checkpoint, biometric-enabled
watchlist, layered security, risks, modeling, privacy,
mass-transit hubs, e-borders, e-interviewer, conflict re-
solving
I. INTRODUCTION
‘Dr. Williams, we will need to speak
with you in private, please come with
me’, asks the border officer by somber voice after
examining Dr. Williams’ passport. ‘Why does this
happen every time I travel’, thinks Dr.
Williams to himself while despondently following the
border officer to the secondary-interview room.
Dr. Williams, a university professor who has never
been in trouble with the law, complains that every time
he travels, he is erroneously identified as being on the
border-crossing watchlis, assumedly due to an unlucky
coincidence. The unfortunate reality for Dr. Williams is
that border officers are obligated to conduct a secondary-
interview whenever a travelers name is identified as
being a likely match on the watchlist. As a result, Dr.
S. Yanushkevich, and V. Shmerko are with Biometric Technology
Laboratory, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
University of Calgary, Canada, Web: http://www.ucalgary.ca/btlab.
E-mail: {syanshk,vshmerko}@ucalgary.ca. K. W. Sundberg is with
Department of Economics, Justice, and Policy Studies, Mount Royal
University, Canada, E-mail: ksundberg@mtroyal.ca. N. W. Twyman
is with Missouri University of Science and Technology, U.S.A.
E-mail: nathantwyman@mst.edu. R. M. Guest is with School of
Engineering and Digital Arts, University of Kent, U.K., E-mail:
R.M.Guest@kent.ac.uk.
Williams, as with other travelers with a similar name,
must endure the stress and anxiety of being mistaken
as a watchlist target. Not only do travelers like Dr.
Williams have the repeated annoyance and embarrass-
ment of having to endure a secondary-interview every
time they cross a border, they also risk missing flights or
even having their traveling companions view them with
suspicion. Regrettably, there are many similar situations
when innocent persons are unnecessarily screened by
border officers at airports, seaports, and land-crossings;
a situation known as ‘misidentification’. Simply put,
‘misidentification’ is when a person is initially matched
to a name on a watchlist, yet upon closer examination,
is found to not match the watchlist record.
Misidentification remains a common occurrence due
to shortcomings in current watchlist technologies and
provides the principal motivation for this paper. Con-
temporary checkpoint is a cyber-physical computational
platform that includes traveler authentication [23], [29],
[48] using e-passport/ID [5], watchlist screening [9],
[51], [86], concealed object detection [32], [60], inter-
viewing [1], [4], [61], and risk assessment [49], [74],
[76], [78], [91] under umbrella of justice and privacy
issues [10], [15], [19]. In the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) roadmap [36], four pillars of the
checkpoint of the future are identified: computation
intelligence, operations, infrastructure, and economic
measures. Self-service based on the intelligent human-
machine and machine-machine interactions is the key
trend in nowadays checkpoint design. The focus of this
paper is biometric-enabled watchlist screening as a part
of such checkpoint.
Watchlist screening is a mandatory mechanism of
national and international security [10], [19], [29], [47].
In border crossing applications, a watchlist check aims
to mitigate the risk that a ‘persona non-grata’ crosses
the border [85], [86] . In essence, a watchlist provides a
source by which various types of vulnerabilities rang-
ing from traveler service inconvenience (wrong alarm)
to allowing a person of interest to cross the border
(impersonation attack) must be safeguarded against.
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with screening effectiveness is a human and machine
performance challenge.
Fast-forward to future, Dr. Williams will interact with
an intelligent biometric-enabled machine having the ca-
pability to identify him by more than just his name,
ultimately making his travel experience less stressful,
and the duties of border officers more effective, efficient,
and focused. In this paper, we focus on capabilities of
watchlist technology that would provide an appropriate
balance between privacy and security. The core idea of
our study is to integrate a biometric-enabled watchlist
with an interview supporting machine, or ’e-interviewer’.
In today’s practice, the security and privacy issues of an
biometric-enabled e-interviewer, from one side, and the
non-biometric watchlist (A-watchlist) screening from an-
other side, operate separately; that is, screening resources
of e-interview are not being utilized for watchlist needs
[61], [71], [82].
A biometric-enabled watchlist for rapid screening
requires intelligent computing and a smart supporting
infrastructure for the e-interviewer. It is technically rea-
sonable to adopt the concept of e-interviewer for the
purpose of the next generation of watchlist screening.
We have designed, modeled, and prototyped this hybrid
approach and observed that (a) security is improved,
(b) the technology gap between current systems and the
next system generation is decreased, and (c) the system
cost is reduced [49], [50], [68], [82]. However, the
privacy aspects of these solutions are more sophisticated
compared to traditional approaches based on separation
of traveler authentication, watchlist screening, and inter-
viewing, and requires additional study, which is a central
focus of this paper.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
related work is briefly reviewed. In Section III, we
articulate the taxonomical overview of layered security;
In Section IV, we describe the three core types of human
identity; In Section V, we introduce the technical and
privacy background of watchlist screening; In Section
VI, we explain why contemporary watchlists pose risks;
In Section VII, we identify why the rapid profiling in
mass-transit hubs (i.e. airports and seaports) remains a
challenge; In Section VIII, we offer a brief overview
of achievements in screening technologies and describe
their horizons; In Section IX, we illustrate a novel
balancing mechanism between security and privacy for
future generations of watchlists; and finally, in Section X,
we summarize the results in the form of the conceptual
trends.
II. RELATED WORK
A framework of the biometric-enabled watchlist
screening using e-interviewer, in addition to traveler au-
thentication, is comprised of deception detection mech-
anisms, spoken-dialog technology, and risk-assessment
techniques. While the automated, biometric-based au-
thentication is currently being deployed [25], the other
components are at various development stages. Decep-
tion detection currently provides accuracy of 70%–77%
when using facial image analysis [1], [88], and 52%
when using voice-based clues [46]. Current technology
gaps in the spoken-dialog machines are identified in
review [93]. Those gaps include, in particular, absence of
standard for testing and evaluation. An automated juris-
dictional control of human-machine interactions, known
as automated legal problem, is still an open problem,
too [11]. Advanced biometric-enabled systems have been
analyzed, in particular, in the following applications: 1)
ambient intelligence systems [2], [21], [54]; 2) affect-
aware computer applications [18]; 3) authentication ma-
chines [23], [48], and e-passports/ID technology [5]; 4)
health, ambient intelligence, and security [26]. The key
trend of e-borders is the integration of intelligent support
at all levels of surveillance, control, and decision-making
[25], [31], [36], [68]. Evidence accumulation and risk
assessment machines are the critical components of this
trend [29], [80]. They are mandatory in border crossing
checkpoints, airports, and seaports, and are considered
to be prospects for the future transportation systems and
mass transit hubs [28]. In the area of risk assessment,
significant progress has recently been reported in tasks
such as watchlist check using surveillance face images
[94], screening technology [73], and face verification
from surveillance video frames [30].
III. TAXONOMICAL OVERVIEW OF THE WATCHLIST
LAYERED SECURITY
We distinguish four levels of the watchlist technology,
based on the Human-Human (H-H) and Human-Machine
(H-M) interactions (Fig. 1):
Level I, – Non-automated classic H-H technology in
which a border personnel assesses the traveler’s risk
using a list of names (Fig. 1-I). Any legislation problems
and conflict situations are resolved by human.
Level II, – In the contemporary automated risk as-
sessment, the traveler is profiled using the e-ID and a
non-biometric watchlist (Fig. 1-II). Again, a human may
be involved in resolving the legislation problems. This H-
M technology is being used in multiple countries already
[25], [29], [35], [48], [68].
Level III, – In the contemporary Pilot Projects, the
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[71], [82] (Fig. 1-III). A non-biometric watchlist check
can be added. Any legislation problems are being re-
solved by a human. This H-M technological level is
compatible with levels I and II.
Level IV, – The proposed improvement of the e-
interview performance (Fig. 1-IV) using a biometric-
enabled watchlist and the automated jurisdictional con-
trol of the machine-generated questions called Conflict
Resolver. Functions of the Conflict Resolver can be
extended to provide legislation information for travelers.
(I) (II)
(III) (IV)
Fig. 1. Four evolutionary levels of the watchlist technology: (I)
non-automated H-H interactions; (II) H-M interactions using the
automated border control machines; (III) H-M interactions using an
e-interviewer; (IV ) H-M interactions assisted by a biometric-enabled
Watchlist and a Conflict Resolver.
These levels of the watchlist technology correspond
to a layered security paradigm. In practice, various
combinations of layers have been proposed in order to
improve security measures:
• The border personnel may not perform their task
efficiently without automated assistance, thus, Level I
does not satisfy the security requirements.
• Certain level of automation used at Level II provides
some support in rapid traveler authentication but the
watchlist remains non-biometric.
• At Level III, the e-interviewer technology assists
in evaluating the risk of deception, however, a non-
biometric watchlist is used.
• According to resent studies [49], [50], [91] using
the biometric-enabled watchlists (Level IV) is impera-
tive. This may, however, decrease the performance. This
can be mitigated by: 1) integrating a biometric-enable
watchlist in the e-interviewer based on the concept of
intensive H-M cooperation, and 2) complimenting it with
an additional control of H-M interactions using a conflict
resolving mechanisms.
Biometric-enabled watchlist screening is the core of
traveler risk assessment, and an integrated part of layered
security. A special supporting infrastructure is needed to
perform the clearance tasks. The term “layered security”
also known as a “Swiss Cheese” model, addresses the
security doctrine [16], [25], [78], [81] and its practical
realization as a multi-state model [35], [59]. The idea
of layered security is to distribute available resources
(such as organizational topology, surveillance network,
security personnel and service machines) in an optimal
way in order to expedite traveler screening and service
performance. A risk assessment of a given individual is
an essential part of the layered security approach [25],
[85], [86], [87], with the traveler risk assessment being
a cornerstone of screening technologies. An example in-
cludes the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
automated targeting system [19]. It was reported in [7],
[23] that an automated border control (ABC) machine di-
rected 8 out 100 (8.13%) travelers to the manual control
because their names were on the watchlist. Geographical
data of deployed ABC machines is periodically updated
[37].
Fig. 2 provides a taxonomical view of a multi-state
security checkpoint based on the traveler risk monitoring
and control techniques including risk assessment, risk
causal analysis, risk propagation, risk adjustment, risk
fusion, risk reasoning, and risk prediction. Traveler’s
risk is assessed using various mechanisms of forward
risk propagation (a process from effect to causes), and
backward risk propagation (a process from causes to
effect) through the states. Risks states are adjusted using
their causal relationships. This is the core principle
of risk mitigation. Given a risk score and the state
screening resources, a risk fusion results in a final
decision. Biometric-enabled resources for the watchlist
screening can be placed in one state, or distributed over
several states. Formal aspects of some tasks, such as risk
propagation, can be found in [22], and can be adopted,
in particular, from multi-echelon supply chain problem
[62], [70]. Other parts of the formalization of a multi-
state screening model, such as risk mitigation, consen-
sus of risk conflict assessments, and trust relationships
between screening states, are commonly adopted from
advanced group decision-making studies [8], [17], [56].
The value of the proposed taxonomical view (Fig. 2) is
twofold:
1) This is a technology-independent model of any
security checkpoint including four evolutionary
levels of the watchlist technology (Fig. 1) which
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Fig. 2. Taxonomical view of multi-state security checkpoint.
2) This is a generalized model of a cognitive check-
point which allows for local and global perception-
action cycles and some necessary attributes of
cognitive dynamical system [34].
Risk assessment resources are distributed in both
physical and virtual/digital world. Layered security pro-
vides developers with the possibilities to mitigate against
unwanted effects and/or emphasize attractive features of
technologies, optimize security resources, manage risk
costs and performance, as well as operations with de-
graded resources. In [39], the design goal is to minimize
risks that “all the holes of a “Swiss Cheese” model do
not line up”. Some efforts to improve the performance
of layered security have been reported with respect
to: 1) topology of the waiting queuing lines [53] and
checkpoint flow models [52]; 2) optimization of the
passenger flows [64], [89]; 3) development of security
measures [16], [78], including measures of the cost of
travel time variability [24]; 4) cost-efficient minimization
of security layers [77]; 5) modeling and simulation using
a multi-state model of service [59], analytic hierarchy
model [92] and hybrid models; for example, combining
analytic hierarchy model and others, such as Dempster-
Shafer [6], and Bayesian [58]; 6) traveler authentication
and risk assessment, in particular, using multi-metric
causal models [50], [91]; and cognitive agent models
[45].
In these developments, different models of layered
security for practical needs are demonstrated. For exam-
ple, the conceptual models for risk assessment such as
[78], provide useful information for a general vision of
security infrastructure. In contrast, the model proposed
by [59] reflects some particular aspects of traveler risk
assessment.
The main requirement is to design a layered security
structure in such manner that one layer compensates the
limitations of another, and to discover the mechanisms
that produce mutual reinforcement; the layers providing
greater protection together compared to the sum of their
individual effects [78]. For example: a) Efficiency of
surveillance can be elevated via camera networking and
their synchronization for tracking persons of interest, as
well as integration of intelligent mechanisms [13], [20];
b) Performance of authentication can be improved via
some preliminary traveler identification or recognition
[50], and meta-recognition [72]; c) Performance of trav-
eler risk assessment can be improved via a distributed
pre-check mechanism [19], [25], [80]; d) Risks of attack
can be mitigated via a specific space configuration and
a topology of the queuing lines [53].
Rapid automation using human-machine and machine-
machine interactions brings new possibilities in layered
security methodologies, however these implementations
often imbalance previously optimized security schemes
[25], [29], [48], [76]. Our study focuses on these aspects
and suggests a realistic cognitive model of traveler risk
assessment (primary using biometric-enabled watchlist
techniques) in the layered security infrastructure.
The mainstream in state-of-the-art layered security
[10], [19], [25], as well as in long-term perspectives [36],
[80], envisions the following characteristics of traveler
authentication methods: 1) integration of authentication
machines [5], [23], [48]; 2) prioritizing the self-service
using intelligent spoken-dialog machines [93] and e-
interviewer [1], [61], [82]; and 3) implementing traveler
risk assessment using resources of both physical and
virtual/digital worlds [50], [91].
Self-service in traveler authentication, and in other
services, is implemented via a human-machine interac-
tion in which the user cooperates with machine instead
of another user who may be uncooperative (walking,
talking, running user). Thanks to this fact, in any config-
uration of security layers, the machines for supporting
self-service operations can be used as the source of
traveler screening data. This suggests that interview
supporting technologies should be integrated in these
machines. From this perspective, our analysis delivers
the following technology landscape: 1) Dynamical prob-
abilistic models [64], [89]; they better reflect layered
security properties; 2) Deep inference in traveler risk
assessment [49]; 3) Predictive analytic and modeling
including deep learning in traffic flow prediction [57];
4) Traveler surveillance in physical world [10], [33],
and virtual/digital world [9]; 5) Managing distributed
resources [25]; 6) Attack countermeasures [5], [12], [14],
[27]; 7) Technology gaps identification [36], [49], [80],
including attack mitigation [63].
IV. CONTRIBUTION
This paper contributes to the concept of layered secu-
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Specifically, the study addresses the area of traveler risk
assessment using cognitive computational platform that
utilized a biometric-enabled watchlist technology. First
of all, this paper provides the taxonomical vision of
the watchlist technological landscape. Secondly, based
on our experience in developments of biometric-enabled
watchlist technology and e-interviewer techniques for
rapid traveler screening, a key contribution of this paper
is the identification of privacy risk factors introduced
by future generations of watchlist screening, caused by
automation. For mitigation of these risks, we propose:
1) A novel balancing mechanism between security and
privacy; this mechanism is implemented via integration
of the biometric-enabled watchlist functions into an e-
interviewer; and
2) A novel intelligent privacy control of (a) machine-
human interactions (the machine can generate legally
incorrect questions), and (b) machine-machine interac-
tions (machines can commit mistakes when operating
with private data) for protecting a traveler’s privacy; we
call this a Conflict Resolver.
This paper also proposes an extension of terminol-
ogy. In particular, in addition to coining the term ‘Re-
dress Complaint Disposition (RCD) metric’, we pro-
pose the terms ‘E-interviewer’, ‘Conflict Resolver’, ‘Pri-
vacy Gap’, ‘Data Life-Cycle Period’, and ‘Imperson-
ation/Deception Risk Landscape’ within the lexicon of
those who engage in related research.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
attempt to introduce future privacy concerns and con-
siderations when developing next-generation watchlists
based on the evaluation of technological gaps.
V. THREE TYPES OF HUMAN IDENTITY AND
WATCHLISTS
Todays e-borders constitute one of the most signifi-
cant and ambitious advancements in border management
and security. E-borders include layered security that is
achieved using both national and international standards,
along with advanced authentication and risk assessment
technologies that operate in compliance with privacy
policy and law [15], [25], [35], [48]. Most countries
around the world are involved in the e-borders project
including the United States (US-VISIT), European Union
(SmartBorders), Hong Kong, China (e-channels), Aus-
tralia and New Zealand (SmartGate), Singapore (eIACS),
and the United Arab Emirates (e-gates). Central to e-
borders around the world is the use of watchlist screening
as the core means to assess a traveler’s risk.
Definition 1. Three types of human identity are distin-
guished in watchlist technologies [83]:
Type I: Attributed (name, date and place of birth);
Type II: Biometric (such as face, iris, fingerprint, retina,
gait, dynamic signature, and DNA profile); and
Type III: Biographical (life events including details of
education, employment, marriage, mortgage, and
property ownership).
The human identity check is characterized by as-
sessing risk of traits at every layer of security system.
The layered security doctrine is a rational approach for
identity check modeling and implementation:
− Attributed data of the ID verification must be sup-
ported by reliable biometric traits which represent
evidence.
− Any potential attacks aiming at impersonation must
be mitigated via biographical data,
− Risk of a wanted person mis-identification ad-
dresses the three components: attributed, biometric,
and biographical data.
The ISO Standard [38] provides recommendations
for the biometric-enabled border management using
a watchlist. The following scenario is considered as
an example. An individual is attempting to enter the
United States. There is a watchlist hit, but there are no
derogatory FBI IAFIS (Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System) records for the individual. This
scenario is represented by the following basic flow of
events: 1) An individual arrives at the border; 2) An
officer scans the individual’s machine-readable docu-
mentation; 3) The system locates a 2-print watchlist
record for the individual based on the information en-
tered (verify); 4) The officer sends the individual to a sec-
ondary inspection; 5) The system retrieves and displays
to the Secondary Officer the individual’s secondary view
data, including the watchlist hit (retrieve data). 6) The
secondary Officer captures the individual’s 10 fingerprint
images, and makes (and records) the entry decision. 7)
The system links the decision and current encounter data
to the individual’s record (set biographic and biometric
data).
Most contemporary watchlists use attributed data for
the rapid screening of traveler who presents a passport
or other identity document (as was the case in the
earlier fictitious example using Dr. Williams) these
are known as A-watchlists. More sophisticated watch-
lists use biometric data for the screening of visas that
are affixed within a passport these are known as
B-watchlists. In future generations of watchlists, all
types of identity will be used. Lastly, biographical data
is used when screening traveler during a more in-
depth person-to-person secondary-interview these are
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advancements in e-borders and watchlists, it is of critical
importance to note that virtually every watchlist contains
incomplete, erroneous, or outdated data.
For all e-borders watchlist screening programs, the
analysis of human identity (attributed, and/or biomet-
ric, and/or biographical) is proceeded using verifica-
tion/identification algorithms. In essence, human identity
is ‘checked’ by reviewing a traveler’s e-passport data
against the watchlist. Then, if the traveler is verified to
an acceptable degree of confidence as being ‘trusted’,
they are permitted past the checkpoint. Conversely, if
during identity analysis the e-border system identifies a
traveler as likely being a person noted on the watchlist,
border officers are alerted and the traveler is removed
for secondary interviewing and examination. At each
differing stage of the e-border screening process, privacy
considerations are addressed to safeguard against having
the travelers privacy and mobility rights violated.
Considering the importance accuracy plays within any
e-borders system, in particular the importance of legal
compliance and ensuring efficient, effective, and prompt
border clearance it is of vital consideration that engi-
neers and others involved in system design and operation
take all reasonable and prudent steps to avoid watchlist
data errors or omissions. Equally, those who are re-
sponsible for inputting data into e-borders systems must
ensure they do so in a comprehensive, accurate, ethical,
and legally compliant manner only using credible and
confirmed information acquired through reliable sources.
Lastly, certain processes must be in place to safeguard
against duplicate data, missing and conflicting records,
along with a rapid means to delete or otherwise correct
data that is no longer valid, incorrect, or unconfirmed.
For example, the core of US-VISIT is the IDENT
system that fulfills three security layers: 1) it confirms the
identities of trusted travelers, 2) alerts law enforcement
if a traveler’s ID invokes derogatory information, and 3)
alerts agents when someone is using a different persona
or biographic identity than in earlier DHS encounters
[42].
While the vast majority of traveler screened by the
CBP are quickly processed, there are nevertheless are
some travelers who are erroneously believed to be a
subject on the watchlist, resulting in them being sub-
jected to secondary interviewing, physical search, and
other enforcement processes.
Biometric identity sources are distinguished as phys-
iological biometrics such as face, fingerprints, and iris;
behavioral biometrics such as facial expressions, body
dynamics, and voice, as well as group and crowd be-
havior; and social biometrics that utilize the fact that a
growing portion of off-line and on-line human activities
leave digital footprints in various databases and social
media. Each of these sources is an essential component
of traveler risk assessment when used in combination,
the result being more effective and accurate border
screening and processing.
VI. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE WATCHLIST
TECHNOLOGY
Irrespective of the various watchlists that exit, there
currently are no commonly agreed set of factors or
standard on which to evaluate implementation and per-
formance. Despite that lack of standardization, most
national border security watchlists nevertheless share the
same fundamentals of watchlist technology.
Definition 2. Watchlist is defined as a mandatory mech-
anism of e-borders which enables the ability to identify
individuals of interest using biometric modalities and re-
lated context information (Definition 1). The fundamental







where ‘Data type’ means non-biometric, biometric, or
mixed.
The efficiency of any watchlist depends on these three
characteristics [85]. Given a person of interest, the pri-
vacy gap in the watchlist refers to the risks of operational
phases between biometric acquisition/placement and data
deletion. This time interval is called the data life-cycle
period.
The experience of developing and deployment of
CAPPS (Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-screening
System) screening technology suggests that (a) the
above characteristic package can be supported only par-
tially by contemporary technologies, and (b) an efficient
mechanism for updating should be developed [47].
There is a number of reasons a traveler may be stopped
as a result of watchlist check: (a) watchlist matches, (b)
misidentification as a person of interest, or (c) someone
mistakenly included the traveler in the watchlist. As a
result of the watchlist screening process, the travelers
may complain that they were adversely affected and
seeks redress. In most nations having e-borders, a redress
process exists through which aggrieved travelers can log
a complaint with the government agency responsible for
border screening. In the US, the U.S. Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC) established the Redress Complaint Dispo-
sition (RCD) to evaluate watchlist performance [85].
Definition 3. The Redress Complaint Disposition
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logged as the result of a traveler complaining about
being erroneously stopped during the border crossing
process seeking some form of redress for this error.








Unfortunately, each of these states can be a source
of an incorrect decision. For example, ‘Misidentified’
means that the complainant, who is the subject of
a terrorist-related screening but whose identity is not
on the terrorist watchlist, is considered to have been
misidentified because of name, date of birth, or passport
number similarity.
The watchlist check impacts the border clearance
performance such as the overall performance, which is
defined as the throughput (number of travelers served
per hour), as well as the operational reject rate, which
is expressed by the clause “one in N travelers (1 : N ) is
wrongly directed to manual authentication”. Efficiency
of the watchlist screening and related privacy indicators
are measured via a set of parameters, in particular, the
number of misidentifications per/hour and number of
redresses per/month. These factors impact the throughput
and operational reject rate.
There are three sources of privacy impact which can
be defined using distinct types of interactions: 1) H-H,
when a border officer interacts with a traveler for the
watchlist check, 2) H-M, when a machine uses both the
traveler’s ID and evidence for the watchlist check, and
3) M-M, when two or more machines cooperate in the
process of the watchlist check.
In the recent study [50], criteria and taxonomy for
watchlists was developed with a focus on mitigating
the risk of impersonation. Impersonation effects have
different meanings when relating security and privacy
indicators in H-H and H-M interactions. For exam-
ple, beautifying effects on facial attractiveness in social
perception (H-H interactions) such as facial makeup,
colored eye lenses and facial plastic surgery, in H-M
interactions may be considered to be an attack on the
recognition process (the intentional change of appear-
ance, unlike aging which is an unintentional attack, a
natural biological process).
The central problem of the watchlist technology is an
e-personation, – the impersonation of another person or
entity through electronic means. Impersonation leads to
serious national threats. In these scenarios, the machine
for traveler risk assessment can make wrong decisions
because the data about the impersonated individual is
gathered from the moment a ticket is purchased (includ-
ing information such as financial records, phone records,
and social media including e-mails, blog entries, and
website searches), which then is analyzed for the purpose
of traveler risk assessment and to monitor social threats
(community-forming, terrorism, political organizing, or
crime). Detecting impersonation in social media arguably
is the most urgent of problems. In contemporary border
crossing infrastructure, an e-interviewer aims to support
a border officer in their interviewing of traveler. The e-
interviewer is viewed as an affective cognitive system
because it utilizes data derived from behavioral and
emotional states. Though similar in purpose to a tra-
ditional police polygraph machine, the two technologies
use much different strategies, methods, and measures.
The goal of an e-interviewer is to generate a deception
or risk likelihood. It is well documented that in order to
achieve acceptable accuracy for the e-interviewer there
needs to be an analysis and tracking of many differ-
ing modalities containing distinct indicators of potential
deception. Given a set of questions, responses by an
individual are measured using various biometric modal-
ities. They form a modality-specific information content
or risk deception landscape. In the e-interviewer, data
acquisition is implemented via non-contact technologies
using various modalities (acquisition framework) such
as the heart rate and blood pressure (in particular, micro
color facial changes caused by the heartbeat), vocal fea-
tures, oculometric factors, respiratory functions, thermal
features, and kinesic factors. Analysis and profiling of
the risk of deception requires deep inference technology.
‘OK, I know, I complained at least
three times,’ Williams notes, ‘I understand
that this is a typical case where the
balanced scheme of the watchlist check
is in favor of national security but
not my privacy’.
VII. WHY DOES THE LEGACY WATCHLIST POSE
RISKS?
Legacy watchlist practices are based on attributed
identity (A-watchlist) and are today generally viewed as
being ineffective [10], [85], [87]. Reflecting again on the
fictional scenario of Dr. Williams, he is being detained
at border checkpoints because his name and birthday are
the same as someone listed on the watchlist; an obvious
drawback of A-watchlist screening. In almost every
such case, insufficient personal data can be identified as
the root cause. To overcome this problem, the border
officer must try to attain additional information that can
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watchlist. ‘We are sorry to inform you Dr.
Williams, as long as we continue using
this system where a person having your
same name is listed, you will forever
be directed to a secondary-interview
when you seek to cross the border’.
Unfortunately, there is currently no way to overcome
this inherent shortcoming of technology, except some
particular scenarios such as introduced in ISO standard
[38], as well as in [10], [42]. Our study highlights the
need for a new watchlist paradigm.
VIII. WHY WATCHLIST IS AN OPEN RESEARCH
ISSUE?
The International Air Transport Association (IATA)
developed the principles of automated authentication
using e-passport [35] and introduced the future horizon
[36]. Unfortunately, these breakthrough solutions for
traveler authentication only partially address traveler
risk assessment using the watchlist technology. There
are two types of watchlist check procedures “strongly
controlled” and “weakly controlled” each impacting
security and privacy in differing ways.
The “strongly controlled” process assumes a satis-
factory level of technical and management resources to
provide reliable traveler authentication and risk assess-
ment. An example is a consular affairs database that
determines if a foreign national should be granted a
visa to visit the country. We use the term “weakly con-
trolled” to indicate the most difficult part of the watchlist
check that addresses the weaknesses of contemporary
biometric technologies. For example, typical sources of
image degradation include harsh ambient illumination
conditions, mug-shots of facial images taken from pass-
ports, low-quality imaging devices, image compression
and down sampling, out-of-focus acquisition, device or
transmission noise, and motion blur [44], [49], [50], [51].
Significant progress has been achieved in watchlist
screening specific to Entry-Exit systems due in large
part to high performance in biometric modalities [10],
[42]. For example, the Consular Lookout and Support
System (CLASS) is the watchlist screening system used
by CBP officers in the United States when assessing
traveler visas and passports [85], and the Visa Informa-
tion System (VIS) used for Entry-Exit screening in the
Europe Union [25]. While the aforementioned all provide
examples of widely used and generally effective rapid
watchlist screening within mass-transit environments, it
is important to note that much more is still needed in
the way of improving accuracy, usability, and speed.
Advanced recognition techniques for dealing with low-
quality images or other biometric samples cannot be
used in practice because of low reliability. The above
scenarios reflect the concern of growing volume of
travelers across the world. For example, the IATA and
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
predict that the number of international air traveler will
grow at around 4.1% per year. Passenger numbers are
expected to reach 7.3 billion by 2034, with each of
these travelers needing to be checked again a watchlist
(http://www.iata.org/pressroom/). The 2020+ horizon of
future border automation is introduced by IATA in [36].
This roadmap predicts some breakthrough technological
solutions in the near future, such as deep profiling and
continuous risk assessment.
IX. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE AND WHAT IS NEXT?
Contemporary watchlist screening is a highly compos-
ite technology. It includes many parts with sophisticated
sub-components such as recognition, identification, veri-
fication, profiling, risk assessment, checking the authen-
ticity of the documents and biometric templates in e-
passport/ID, prediction, conflict resolving, and decision
making. In our approach, the keystones of watchlist
hierarchy addresses the type of utilized identity within




A-watchlist (Data Type I);
B-watchlist (Data Type I,II);
C-watchlist (Data Type I-III)
Security and privacy aspects of contemporary A- and
B- watchlists are well studied and documented. Exam-
ples of such watchlists include the Interpol Terrorism
Watch List (ITWL) which constitutes a list of fugitives
and suspected terrorists, and the No-Fly List which
constitutes a list of people who are not permitted to
board commercial aircraft due to their involvement with
terrorism and criminality. The forefront of contemporary
watchlist technological developments includes the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)’s ADVISE
machine, CAPPS, Secure Flight, Interagency Border
Inspection System (IBIS), Automated Biometric Identifi-
cation System (IDENT), the FBI’s Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) with search
capabilities for fingerprints, faces, irises, palms, scars,
marks, and tattoos, the U.S. Department of Defense’s
Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) [86],
[87] as well as IATA’s strategic vision [36] and technol-
ogy horizon.
The aforementioned constitutes the current visions
upon which future watchlist technology will emerge the
C-watchlist in our hierarchy. Whereas the reliability of
security indicators is being improved in the C-watchlist,
the privacy impact becomes more complicated for assess-
ment. This is caused by various factors such as imper-
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drawbacks, performance of authentication tools, time-
consuming conflict resolution situations, and potential
thefts of private data. Each scenario taking these factors
into account may not only offend the traveler (wrongly
suspected as terrorists) but may also create a bottleneck
situation favorable for terrorist attacks. This is a critical
point of the balance between security and privacy, and
the reason why the rapid traveler profiling is needed.
Bridging the technological gap between A- and B-
watchlists from one side and C-watchlist from another
side, results in a specific support infrastructure, and
other mechanisms that are defined in our study as e-
interviewer. The C-watchlist uses the sources from vir-
tual world, such as identification of a person of interest
in social media [9], physical world, and interviewing
technologies (evidence).
Challenges and prospects of watchlist check technol-
ogy for e-border applications are summarized in Table I.
Overall,
1) Privacy issues define a new horizon of H-M inter-
actions (deep human profiling) and M-M (manipulation
with human personal data) interactions.
2) The package of technical challenges such as image
recognition, data fusion, and others, reflect the con-
temporary trends in intelligent computation. However,
breakthrough solutions are needed to satisfy the new
requirements for authentication and risk assessment in-
frastructure.
3) The gold standard of the listed challenges is the
power of inference and prediction technologies. These
high priority technologies rely on progress in machine
learning and automated privacy regulations/control.
X. COGNITIVE PLATFORM FOR BALANCING
BETWEEN SECURITY AND PRIVACY VIA
E-INTERVIEWER
Each phase in the evolution of watchlist technology
(that is, A-, B-, and C-type watchlists) upsets the balance
between security and privacy. The B-watchlist provides
more security benefits compared with A-watchlist, but it
involves new privacy risks such as forgery of biometric
traits via various type of attack. The next generation
watchlist (C-watchlist), provides more reliable traveler
screening, whilst introducing new privacy risks caused
by gathering and processing biographical data (Type III
in Definition 1) should be mitigated.
In this section, we propose a mechanism to improve
the balance between security and privacy for this type of
watchlist. Following the concept of interview supporting
machine [61], [82] and recently reported results on
predicting the lie/truth responses of interviews [1], [66],
[71], we developed the e-interviewer with add-in C-
watchlist. In such a machine, the following supporting
computational resources shall be integrated: 1)a genera-
tor of interview question based on advances in spoken-
dialog systems, 2) a controller of privacy issues called
a Conflict Resolver, which operates in 3) an adaptive
feedback loop.
From the taxonomical view point, e-interviewer
is a particular kind of spoken dialog-machines,
or chatbots (also known as chat-agents), such as
Clever-bot, XiaoIce, and Alice [55], [75]. In contrast
to chatbots, task-completion systems are designed
for accomplishing specific tasks, such as intelligent
personal assistants (IPAs), for example, Apple’s
Siri (https://www.apple.com/ios/siri/), Microsoft’s
Cortana (https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/cortana/),
Google Assistant, Facebook M (https://developers.
facebook.com/blog/post/2016/04/12/), and Amazon’s
Alexa (https://developer.amazon.com/alexa/).
Technologies of the contemporary IPAs and trends
are analyzed in [69]. In particular, assistance in the
form of a passive response to user requests is replaced
by proactive anticipation of the user needs, and provides
in-time assistance (reminding of upcoming events
and recommending a useful service). These and other
spoken-dialog machines are based on the following
cognitive criteria:
1) Computational intelligence that explores learning
through H-M and M-M interactions.
2) Feedback principle that is a facilitator of compu-
tational intelligence, and
3) Complex reasoning based on machine learning and
probabilistic reasoning mechanisms.
Conceptually, any cognitive dynamical system consists
of four elements: perception-action cycle, memory, at-
tention, and intelligence [34]. In cognitive checkpoint,
perception-action cycle aims at maximizing information
gain about the traveler evaluated using the observable
data. There are three key components of the perception-
action cycle of the cognitive checkpoint: 1) Traveler as
a subject of multiple security measures in the supported
infrastructure. 2) A Screening actuator that initializes
execution of a security task or several security tasks
such as authentication (e.g. e-ID), human-machine inter-
actions provided by e-interviewer, risk assessment (e.g.
biometric-enabled watchlist and multiple-source infor-
mation gathering), and concealed object detection (e.g.
weapon or dangerous items). 3) An Evidence analyzer
that provides the feedback information to the screening
actuator. For example, to complete authentication task,
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TABLE I
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF WATCHLIST CHECK TECHNOLOGY FOR E-BORDER APPLICATIONS
Challenge Impact on security and privacy, and required breakthrough solution
Privacy, human rights
Legality of 1) Biometric-based profiling (such as facial, iris, fingerprints, blood pressure, and
gait traits, as well features of plastic surgery, and implants), behavioral profiling (signature,
speech and facial response), mental facilities (measures of truthfulness, deception manners);
2) Interviewing technology that uses elements of interrogation techniques, benchmarks and
standards; 3) Control of manipulation of personal data in M-M interactions; and 4) Concept of
Conflict Resolver for protecting traveler privacy.
Interview technology
Spoken interview (or dialog) system for traveler authentication and risk assessment
using physiological and behavioral data, as well as personal data from the digital world.
Benchmarks and standards.
Reliability
Evaluating watchlist information in terms of quality and truthfulness. Metrics for the reliability
of sources (such as “reliable”, “cannot be judged”, “usually reliable”, “fairly reliable”, and
“unreliable”), and information credibility (such as “confirmed”, “cannot be judged”, “probably
true”, and “possibly true”). Attacks and countermeasures.
Efficiency
1) Impact on the border clearance performance such as the overall performance and operational
rejection rate; 2) the number of mis-identifications per/hour, the number of redresses per/month.
the e-interviewer causes the next question; additional
data is needed to complete the risk assessment; and
additional actions are needed to finalize the concealed
object detection (e.g. elicit information, via interview,
about the orthopedic implants being initially detected as
concealed items).
A generic information-centered, or conceptual, model
of the e-interviewer is introduced in Fig. 3. The model
implements the perception-action cycle, and consists of
the following components:
Trait Detectors: comparing the evidence (biometric
traits) and ground truth data to make decisions regarding
a particular feature.
Watchlist: introduces authentication information of
person of interest, including biometric traits. Mechanism
gathering, processing, and sharing personal data is given
Fig. 4.
Baseline Assessment: created at the prototyping and
calibration phasesvia trait inference using precise mea-
suring techniques. For example, the ground truth of
pupil dilation is measured under special conditions using
precise biomedical devices whilst the overall ground
truth (baseline) can be measured using the electro-dermal
activity and electro-encephalogram techniques.
Risk Inference: the deception features obtained by
observing an interviewee are summarized in special
manner including resolving the conflict situations. Also,
the biometric features of interest from watchlist are
compared against the evidence features.
Decision-Making: the machine makes a decision re-
garding the level of truthfulness of the interviewee
Fig. 3. Future generation of the e-interviewer for traveler authenti-
cation and risk assessment via watchlist check and interviewing. The
model implements the perception-action cycle.
this level can be reassessed or confirmed by additional
questions to the person.
Risk Analyzer: 1) it assess the deception risk as
difference between the overall truth baseline and
level of truthfulness, as measured, <Deception
risk, ∆> = <Overall truth baseline> –
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Fig. 4. Traveler risk assessment using biometric-enabled watchlist
and e-interviewer.
features of a person of interest are detected.
Conflict Resolver: the aim of this component is a
jurisdictional control of the questions that are generated,
as well as attorney support to the interviewee if needed.
Generation of interview questions; generated ques-
tions and statements are systematized according to their
impact on human mentality, cultural and social traditions,
as well as security criteria.
E-interviewer operates as follows: (a) a traveler or in-
terviewee is under observation using visual and acoustic
sensors; (b) it is assumed the traveler also presents an e-
ID to the machine; (c) a two channels screening process
is employed: Channel 1 (which is hidden from the trav-
eler) authenticates the travel documents, and then checks
the traveler against available watchlists, and Channel 2
initiates the interview-based screening; (d) data from
Channel 1 is transmitted to Channel 2 in order to
provoke a question; (e) the response of the person being
interviewed is measured using various biometric traits in
comparison with the baseline assessment (ground truth);
(f) deception risk inference results in both the deception
risk landscape and decision-making based on the level of
truthfulness; (g) the deception risk minimizer estimates
the difference between the achieved and required level of
truthfulness; (h) if the level is less than a given threshold
value, the next question is generated; and (i) if the level
is greater than a given threshold value the process is
repeated according to the respective protocol.
XI. COGNITIVE INTERVIEW MANAGEMENT AND
CONFLICT RESOLVING CONCEPT
Legal reasoning is the particular method of arguing
used when applying legal rules to particular interactions
among legal subjects, that is, human and machine in this
paper. The key idea of automation of legal reasoning is
to use the logic of legal texts, norms, and argumentation.
Formal logic-based techniques are well suited for repre-
sentation of legal rules, case facts, and for the inference
that is based on the application of the rules to the facts
[65], [67], [93].
An Conflict Resolver uses the text-mining to automat-
ically profile and extract arguments from legal cases of
border crossing interviews. Text-mining is well known
in justice where case law plays a critical role in legal
reasoning and decision-making [90]. Case law is a corpus
of decisions on cases which judges have made. Such
corpus is extremely large; this fact is the reason for
development of the automated text mining for legal
professionals. In our project, the case base is relatively
small since it stores a specific semantic contents that is
not bounded by any strongly specified dialog scenarios.
Automation of legal reasoning is a well identified
branch of computational intelligence. Emergence of the
e-lawyer coincides with the development of tools and
techniques for rapid, real-time processing of large data
sets that represent traveler interviews under the given
statutes of jurisdiction. Both data-centric and logic-based
models can be used for this purpose. A gap between the
domain expert and a knowledge modeler in terms of legal
argumentation/reasoning have been studied, in particular,
in [67]. This is a subject of a controlled natural language
using legal terms, rules, facts and concepts. A legal
landscape is defined in [11] as a global characterization
of the state of the law relevant to a given set of tasks.
Examples include the automated techniques for legal
patent, tax, and intellectual property landscaping, as well
interview landscaping (related to this study).
In practice, various kinds of uncertainty impact the
deterministic nature of formal logic. This is the main
reason to resort to probabilistic techniques. An overview
of reasoning-based legal techniques is given in [65],
including probabilistic models of legal proof. It should
be mentioned that jurisdictional support to travelers is of
great demand in e-borders, and shall be incorporated in
both the e-lawyer and e-interviewer. This is, however, is
outside of the scope of this paper.
There are two levels of the H-M interaction control:
1) a traditional interview management concerned with
contextual information, and 2) a juridical conclusion
on the automatically generated questions implemented
by the Conflict Resolver. In the interview management,








The Conflict Resolver monitors the generated questions
to assess whether inaccuracy has occurred. For example,
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covered via a strategically developed process. Details can
be found in [93]. Technically, the interview management
is an adaptive intelligent system.
Definition 4. The Conflict Resolver is defined as an
intelligence-enabled and mandatory component of the e-
interviewer. The Conflict Resolver function is twofold:
1) to make the juridical conclusion on the automatically
generated questions, and if needed, to block incorrect
questions; and 2) if needed or otherwise appropriate,
provide attorney support to the traveler.
Fig. 5. The core of Conflict Resolver: architecture for a conversa-
tional legal reasoning system
In Fig. 5, the interviewee is placed in the ques-
tion/answer loop where only legal questions are allowed.
An automatically generated question (in the form of
text) is analyzed by an intelligent inference engine. This
results is the decision about legality of the question.
The person’s response, in natural language, is processed,
and the decision on the next state is made. Note, that
the content of the screening scenarios for any security
applications can be well defined and formalized. From
a general perspective, the Conflict Resolver should be
integrated in any conversational legal reasoning system.
XII. EXAMPLE OF NEAR FUTURE WATCHLIST CHECK
Ideally, three types of identity should be used in the
watchlist as proposed in Definition 1. The question is
how the machine processes this data. The answer is that
the machine shall combine the functionality of both the
contemporary authentication machine and the interview
supporting machine. A possible (and realistic) interaction
scenario can be as follows:
State 1: ‘Good morning, Dr. Williams,
what is the purpose of your trip?’, a vir-
tual border officer is greeting every traveler by name
before starting any formal screening procedure.
Conflict Resolver: Proceed with the question.
Comment:Technically, it is possible because all travelers
and visitors in the airport zone should be identified,
tracked, and their risks should be continuously assessed.
State 2: ‘Business. The only problem
is with parking,’ mumbles Dr. Williams, and
hundreds of biometric traits such as voice pitch and facial
expressions, are acquired and processed for estimation
of the ground truth that is needed for further traveler
response evaluation.
State 3: ‘Sorry about that. Do not
worry, your car is now in zone B103.
Please, present your ID’, asks the machine.
Dr. Williams shows his ID, and the data (including his
biometric traits) are scanned for processing.
Conflict Resolver: Proceed.
State 4: ‘Mr. Williams, please put
your luggage in the control box’, the ma-
chine continues to accumulate the traveler data by fusing
the risks of different items in the luggage.
Conflict Resolver: Proceed with the question.
State 5: ‘Are you traveling with
your spouse?”, asks the virtual officer using infor-
mation that has been sent by another machine.
Conflict Resolver: Proceed with the question.
Comment: This is an example of a machine constructed
question that can be important for traveler risk as-
sessment or other purposes. However, such a question
risks intimidating subjects as it may appear that the
computer somehow knows details about their personal
relationships with others.
State 6: ‘Yes, we are visiting
our daughter,’ states Dr. Williams, knowing that
he must answer all the questions completely and
truthfully adding, “She studies archeology at
the university”. At this time, the machine finishes
the authentication process and starts the watchlist check.
State 7∗ (hidden) The machine formulates the ques-
tion : ‘Is she married?’ however before it is
asked, it is evaluated by the Conflict Resolver.
Conflict Resolver: Dismiss this question.
Comment: In this last state, the question was dismissed
by the Conflict Resolver due to it being irrelevant.
State 8∗ (hidden): Again, the machine formu-
lates another question ‘Dr. Williams, is your
right leg injured?’, however before it is asked,
it is also evaluated by the Conflict Resolver.
Conflict Resolver: Dismiss this question.
Comment: This is a conflicting scenario because the
person of interest on the watchlist, Dr. Williams, has
a record of being lame in the right leg.
State 9: The machine yet again formulates an-
other question, ‘Dr. Williams, did you have
any limb injury?’, and again before it is asked,
it is evaluated by the Conflict Resolver.
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Comment: The machine performs a comparison of all
traits listed on the watchlist and the biometric-based
evidence.
State 10: ‘No, never, Im in good
health and physical condition, and
have been all my life’, answers Dr. Williams.
Note: Conflicting situation is resolved, because the
gait biometrics have not found any abnormality in the
traveler’s (Dr. Williams) gait.
State 11: ‘Thank you Dr. Williams, you
may proceed to the exit.’
Conflict Resolver: Proceed.
XIII. GENERIC TRENDS AS A SUMMARY
Watchlist screening is a routine security procedure that
has been applied in one form or another for centuries.
Today’s reality provides the possibility for automated
screening using all types of identity (attributed, biomet-
ric, and biographical) from both physical and virtual
worlds. As noted, the primary aim of our study was to
answer the question ‘How the development of the next
generation of watchlist for rapid screening can impact
a sensitive balancing mechanism between security and
privacy?’ In this paper, we report the identified directions
of such an impact, trends in watchlist technologies, and
propose to mitigate the potential risks.
Trend A: Delegating more privacy to machines.
Various new, unwanted effects can be expected, espe-
cially risky effects in M-M interactions. To mitigate
the privacy impact in common practice, a general, yet
internally accepted, security and privacy protocol is
needed. The key idea of this protocol would be to
shift the responsibility for storing personal data to its
owner. Technically speaking, traveler biometric data are
not stored in checkpoints (except watchlist) rather the
data is stored in the traveler’s e-passport/ID, resulting in
the traveler having the care, control, and responsibility
for their own e-documents. We follow this approach
and propose a high-level control of H-M and M-M
interactions via set of indicators such as content and
relation to the task, that is, Conflict Resolver.
Trend B: Increasing the depth of social embed-
ding. In feature watchlists, all types of identity data can
be used for screening including traits from surveillance
cameras and social networks (statistical surveillance).
Considering this approach stands to increase the di-
mensions of privacy risks, it is recommended that a
multi-biometric (e.g. in addition to facial recognition, the
iris, and/or fingerprint) be included in the authentication
process. We accept this common approach and propose
the improvement via possibilities of H-M interactions on
the cognitive platform of the e-interviewer.
Trend C: Increasing the role of the behavioral
and soft biometric. This phenomenon addresses the
need to increase the credibility of corresponding sources
and supports the design of automated tools such as the
e-interviewer. Following this trend and proposing the
conceptual improvements to bolster the acceptance of
the e-interviewer concept. This would unquestionably
include steps focused on the balance between security
and privacy.
Common to these trends is the cognitive platform.
Further to proposing a cognitive approach to watchlist
screening, this paper addresses H-M and M-M interac-
tions in the form of an e-interviewer. The biometric-
enabled watchlist as a part of cognitive checkpoint is
closely related to forensics [40], [44], [50] and cyber-
physical forensics [43].
Lastly, ‘e-residency’ based on the block chain tech-
nology [41], [79], and cloud computing [84] are two
other relevant concepts that are subjects of future inves-
tigation in the ever changing layered security landscape.
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